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ARTICLES
FOSTERING INFORMED CHOICE: ALLEVIATING
THE TRAUMA OF GENETIC ABORTIONS
Bret D. Asbury*
Each year, thousands of pregnant women learn of fetal abnormali-
ties through prenatal genetic analysis.  This discovery—made after a wo-
man has initially declined to exercise her right to abort an unwanted
pregnancy—raises the difficult and heart-wrenching question of whether
to terminate on genetic grounds.  Women considering a genetic abortion
rely on information and support from health care providers to assist
them in making their choice.  Though intended to be objective and
nondirective, the support women receive frequently provides them with
incomplete and incomprehensible information having the effect of en-
couraging them to abort genetically anomalous fetuses. As a result, ge-
netic terminations—which cause severe and long-standing psychological
impacts such as pathological grief, depression and post-traumatic
stress—are often the result of something other than a fully informed
choice.
Congress and eleven states have recognized the importance of bet-
ter informing choice by passing legislation aimed at providing clearer
and more balanced information to expectant mothers learning of fetal
genetic abnormalities.  But existing legislative remedies do not ade-
quately address this problem, and this inadequacy will become more
pronounced in future years as increases in access to prenatal genetic
analysis further stretch the capabilities of the available support services.
This Article describes the unique characteristics of terminations for a
fetal abnormality, their troubling and persistent psychological impacts,
and the reasons why they will become more common in future years.  It
then offers proposals for how to reconfigure the prenatal genetic coun-
seling landscape in order to reduce the incidence of genetic terminations
based on incomplete or misleading information, thereby alleviating their
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distinct psychological costs. Its overall objective is to ensure that women
learning of prenatal genetic abnormalities have access to complete and
comprehensible information prior to making their decision and adequate
support whether or not they choose to terminate.
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INTRODUCTION
But I cannot help thinking of the other possibility: that it
was alright after all.  Yes, that really kills me sometimes.
We might have had a child now, and maybe even a
healthy child at that!1
—Father Number 14
Though nearly nine of ten abortions in the United States occur
within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy,2 among the 11% occurring
1 Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Termination of Pregnancy on Genetic Grounds; Coping
with Grieving, 13 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 93, 98 (1992).
2 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, FACTS ABOUT INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2014), www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf (noting that 1/3 of abortions occur
within the first six weeks of gestation and 89% occur within the first twelve).  These termina-
tions can arise out of any number of circumstances.  The Guttmacher Institute describes some
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later there exists a small subset which raise unique and vexing ethical
concerns: abortions of initially wanted pregnancies based on fetal abnor-
malities discovered during prenatal genetic analysis.3  The range of what
constitutes an abnormality serving as the basis for a genetic termination
is considerable.  On one extreme are conditions such as anencephaly, in
which a fetus never develops certain portions of its brain and skull and in
most cases dies during pregnancy or soon after birth.  On the other, con-
ditions such as hemophilia and surgically repairable abdominal wall de-
fects such as omphalocele and gastroschisis fall into this category.  In
between are a number of conditions with varying presentations and a
wide range of potential quality-of-life outcomes, such as cystic fibrosis,
spina bifida, and Trisomy 21 (Down syndrome).
A pregnant woman learning of a fetal abnormality must, at a time of
unique and unanticipated stress and anxiety, develop enough of an under-
standing of the potential challenges she, her child, and her family will be
forced to endure in order to make an informed decision about whether to
bring her pregnancy to term.4  It is here that prenatal genetic counseling
plays a crucial role, assisting expectant mothers in making sense of their
test results and deciding how to proceed.  Unfortunately, genetic counsel-
ing is failing many women, leading to underinformed terminations that
result in unique and longstanding psychological impacts such as patho-
logical grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress.
Though the core aspiration of modern genetic counseling is
“nondirectiveness”—meaning providing unbiased genetic information
rather than guiding expectant mothers to proceed or terminate their preg-
nancy5—numerous studies have shown that real-life practice diverges
of the reasons as follows: “The reasons women give for having an abortion underscore their
understanding of the responsibilities of parenthood and family life.  Three-fourths of women
cite concern for or responsibility to other individuals; three-fourths say they cannot afford a
child; three-fourths say that having a baby would interfere with work, school or the ability to
care for dependents; and half say they do not want to be a single parent or are having problems
with their husband or partner.”  Id. at 1 (citing Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women
Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL &
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 110, 112 (2005)).
3 This Article employs the term “genetic analysis” as a shorthand for prenatal genetic
screening, which assesses the likelihood of a fetal abnormality through a maternal blood test,
and prenatal genetic testing, which confirms certain abnormalities most often through the col-
lection of amniotic fluid or placental tissue.  This distinction is discussed in greater detail in
Part I.
4 To be sure, personal attitudes toward abortion play a significant role in the difficulty
of this decision.  For mothers who would choose to bring their fetus to term under any circum-
stance, a genetic abnormality serves only as a basis for learning more about their fetus’s condi-
tion and preparing for raising a child with special needs.  For those who would consider having
an abortion under some circumstances, however, the choice can be extraordinarily difficult.
5 See, e.g., Patricia L. Devers et al., Noninvasive Prenatal Testing/Noninvasive Prenatal
Diagnosis: The Position of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 22 J. GENETIC COUN-
SELING 291, 292 (2013) (“NSCG firmly believes that reproductive decisions should be made in
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significantly from this objective.6  Expectant mothers who undergo ge-
netic counseling frequently feel that they receive incomplete or one-sided
information that stresses the negative aspects of genetic findings rather
than the unknown or positive aspects.7  As a result, women frequently
come away from counseling sessions with inaccurately grim prognoses
for their future child’s quality-of-life, which in turn makes them more
likely to abort on genetic grounds, as most of them do. In this way ge-
netic counseling is all too often anything but nondirective, and critiques
acknowledging that the nondirectiveness aspiration remains elusive have
emerged from both outside and within the field.8
Genetic terminations occupy a unique space between traditional
abortions and the generally more traumatic outcome of stillbirth.9  Hav-
ing already chosen to bring a fetus to term—and having often begun to
show and share the joyous news with friends and loved ones—pregnant
women learning of a fetal abnormality find themselves in the difficult
position of revisiting this decision at a much later stage, when their ex-
pectations and aspirations for their unborn child have begun to develop
more fully.  It should come as no surprise that the subsequent experience
of women who exercise their right to traditional abortions differs mark-
edly from those who terminate on genetic grounds.  Whereas the former
experience no increased risk of mental health problems following a sin-
the context of unbiased and comprehensive information, free from discrimination or coer-
cion . . . .”) (citing Position Statement: Reproductive Freedom, NAT’L SOC’Y OF GENETIC
COUNSELORS (June 1, 2010), http://nsgc.org/p/bl/et/blogid=47&blogaid=35).
6 See infra Part I.B for a discussion of these studies and the nature of genetic counseling
in practice more generally.
7 See, e.g., Christy D. Roberts et al., The Role of Genetic Counseling in the Elective
Termination of Pregnancies Involving Fetuses with Disabilities, 36 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 48, 53
(2002) (finding that 87% of women in their cohort “indicated that genetic counseling did not
give them information about future-quality-of-life issues for a child with a disability” and
86.2% “indicated that the genetic counselor did not provide them with both positive and nega-
tive aspects of giving birth to a child with a disability”); Anne C. Madeo et al., The Relation-
ship Between the Genetic Counseling Profession and the Disability Community: A
Commentary, 155 AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 1777, 1779 (2011) (describing a Down
syndrome study finding that while 95% of genetic counselors discussed its underlying bi-
omedical aspects, just 26% described its many well-documented and positive “social aspects
of life” and finding that among the genetic counseling encounters analyzed, “86% mentioned
pregnancy termination, 37% continuation of pregnancy, and 13% adoption”) (citing E. Farrelly
et al., Genetic Counselors and Prenatal Testing: Where is the Discussion About Disability?, 19
J. GENETIC COUNSELING 671, 671 (2010)).
8 See, e.g., Madeo et al., supra note 7, at 1777–80 (discussing some of the tensions R
between the attitudes and practices of genetic counselors and the perspectives of disability and
advocacy communities).
9 Korenromp et al., supra note 1, at 95 (“Termination of pregnancy on genetic grounds R
is different from abortion in that it is an initially wanted pregnancy.  It differs from stillbirth
because the parents themselves have to decide whether the child will live or die.”).
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gle abortion,10 the latter often suffer significant negative psychological
effects.11  One study has gone so far as to conclude that “termination of
an abnormal pregnancy in the second trimester should be regarded as no
less serious than a stillbirth and . . . acute grief by the parents must be
expected.”12  The lasting emotional and psychological impact of genetic
terminations—on not just the women carrying these fetuses, but also on
their partners and living children—evidences the crucial importance of
prenatal genetic counseling and underscores the extent to which it is cur-
rently failing pregnant women.
Recognizing the national significance of these issues, Congress
passed the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness
Act.13  Co-sponsored by anti-abortion crusader Sen. Sam Brownback (R-
Kan.) and pro-choice and disability-rights advocate Sen. Ted Kennedy
(D-Mass.), the Act was signed into law by President Bush in October of
2008.  Though noble in its aims at addressing a number of the deficien-
cies in genetic counseling described in this Article,14 the Act has been
and remains grossly underfunded and has yet to have any meaningful
impact.  More recently, there has been a flurry of activity at the state
level seeking to address the deficiencies of genetic counseling.  To date,
eleven states have passed legislation aimed at providing additional infor-
mation to women learning of fetal genetic abnormalities, nine of which
have done so since 2012.15  Though this state action has the potential to
fill some of the gaps in genetic counseling highlighted but not addressed
by the federal Act, such legislation is limited both geographically and
10 See BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH
AND ABORTION, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 91
(2008), www.apa.org/pi/wpo/mental-health-abortion-report.pdf.
11 For a detailed discussion of the emotional and psychological impact of genetic termi-
nations, see infra Part II.
12 S. H. Elder & K. M. Laurence, The Impact of Supportive Intervention After Second
Trimester Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnormality, 11 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 47, 53
(1991); see also Charles H. Zeanah et al., Do Women Grieve After Terminating Pregnancies
Because of Fetal Abnormalities? A Controlled Investigation, 82 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
270, 274 (1993) (“The results of the current investigation suggest that the psychological adap-
tation of women following prenatal diagnosis and termination of pregnancy is more like that of
women who experience a spontaneous perinatal loss, with whom they share a wanted preg-
nancy, than that of women who undergo elective termination, with whom they share a volun-
tary decision to terminate.”).
13 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No.
110–374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008).
14 See id. at 4051 (describing the purposes of the Act as being to “provide up-to-date
information on the range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition,
including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes,” “strengthen ex-
isting networks of support” for families facing prenatally and postnatally diagnosed conditions,
and “ensure that patients receive up-to-date, evidence-based information about the accuracy”
of tests diagnosing Down syndrome and other genetic conditions).
15 See infra Part II.
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with respect to the conditions addressed, and it does nothing to reform
the status quo of prenatal genetic counseling as a whole.
Moreover, though prenatal genetic counseling currently plays a
meaningful role in only a tiny fraction of pregnancies, the scale and
scope of the psychological challenges borne out of its deficiencies will
increase manifold in the upcoming years for two reasons.  First, by ex-
panding the number of women covered by Medicaid, establishing base-
line coverage requirements for preventive care for women, and
categorizing maternity and newborn care as “essential benefits” that must
be covered by all insurers, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA)16 will grant millions of women newfound access to low-cost
or free genetic screening, testing, or both.17  Second, whereas the most
accurate forms of genetic testing most commonly employed today are
invasive and potentially harmful to the fetus, pinpoint accurate, risk-free
Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD) has arrived and is being rapidly
deployed across the country.  Taken together, these two changes—free or
low-cost prenatal genetic screening for a broader population of women
and advances in NIPD—could result in an increase in prenatal genetic
testing from less than 100,000 per year to over 3,000,000.18
Seeking to address prenatal genetic counseling’s current shortcom-
ings, the failure of legislative efforts to address them, the profound psy-
chological impacts of genetic terminations, and the imminent explosion
in the demand for prenatal genetic counseling, this Article argues for a
radical shift in how healthcare providers treat women learning of prenatal
genetic abnormalities.  Due to their unique circumstances and attendant
psychological risks, all such women should be presented with balanced,
up-to-date, and accurate information regarding the implications of bring-
ing their fetuses to term and have easy access to adequate support ser-
vices whether or not they proceed with their pregnancies.  As will be
shown below, women currently have access to nothing of this sort.
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides an overview of
the current role of prenatal genetic screening, testing, and counseling in
pregnancy and describes the challenges inherent in deciding whether to
bring a genetically anomalous fetus to term.  It then offers a closer exam-
ination of prenatal genetic counseling, showing that it is frequently direc-
tive in practice, nudging women toward aborting genetically anomalous
fetuses without complete information.  Part II describes the unique and
troubling traumatic psychological impacts that genetic abortions can
16 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–448, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
17 See infra Part IV.A.
18 See Henry T. Greely, Get Ready for the Flood of Fetal Gene Screening, 469 NATURE
289, 290 (2011).
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have on expectant mothers and their families, identifying elevated rates
of grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress as the primary indicators.
Part III discusses federal and state legislative responses to prenatal ge-
netic counseling’s incomplete and at times directive presentation of in-
formation and describes their inadequacies.  These inadequacies will
become increasingly salient in future years due to the emerging growth
in the need for prenatal genetic counseling ushered in by the Affordable
Care Act’s expansion of access to prenatal genetic analysis and the rap-
idly evolving field of Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis, which are dis-
cussed in Part IV.  Part V offers suggestions for how to address the
oncoming explosion in the need for widespread, improved genetic coun-
seling.  Using the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act as a starting point, this Part proposes model pro-informa-
tion legislation and describes how medical professionals should treat ex-
pectant mothers (and their partners) learning of a fetal abnormality from
the outset through their decision whether or not to terminate.
I. THE PRENATAL GENETIC LANDSCAPE
Because just one in sixteen babies in the Unites States is born with a
birth defect,19 the majority of parents (to say nothing of the population as
a whole) are largely unfamiliar with the significant role that prenatal ge-
netic analysis and counseling play in determining which babies are born
and which fetuses are terminated.  But for any pregnant woman who has
come face-to-face with an anomalous genetic screening or test result, the
role of these fledgling fields in determining her reproductive choices can-
not be overstated.  Due to the life-altering impact of the decision to ter-
minate or bring to term a genetically anomalous fetus, an exploration of
the scaffolding currently surrounding that choice is essential prior to pro-
ceeding to discuss how it can be improved.  This Part provides an over-
view of prenatal genetic analysis and counseling in operation and offers a
glimpse into the anguish expectant mothers experience upon learning of
a fetal genetic anomaly.  It then examines how prenatal genetic counsel-
ing falls short in providing expectant mothers with much of the informa-
tion they need in deciding whether to terminate and explains why
nondirectiveness remains an elusive objective.
A. Prenatal Screening, Testing, and Counseling
Being told that one’s fetus has an actual or potential genetic abnor-
mality produces a rush of fear, heartache, and concern.  Having chosen to
keep rather than abort their pregnancies at the outset, women receive this
sad news as they are preparing to be mothers, and few of them anticipate
19 TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 39 (2d ed. 2003).
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that the child they are carrying will be anything other than normal and
healthy.  Indeed, one can safely assume that the vast majority of these
women have never considered any of the ethical, financial, and psycho-
logical challenges that carrying a genetically anomalous fetus to term
will entail, and many have never entertained the possibility of having an
abortion.  Yet suddenly they must.
Some women learn of a potential fetal abnormality through first-
trimester serum screening, a test of the mother’s blood that usually takes
place between the eleventh and thirteenth weeks of pregnancy.20  Others
become aware of a potential abnormality during the more customary sec-
ond-trimester quad or triple serum screen, which takes place after the
fourteenth week of pregnancy.  In either case, the serum screening does
not provide a definitive diagnosis, but rather an indication that there is an
elevated likelihood of a genetic abnormality, that there might be a
problem.21
Nonetheless, a “screen-positive” result can be difficult to bear.
Learning through serum screening that one’s fetus has, for example, an
“elevated risk” of Down syndrome is horrifying, despite the fact that out
of any 1000 pregnancies as many as 40 can screen positive for this con-
dition, and just one of these 40 will actually have Down syndrome.22
Though far from definitive, an indication of elevated risk through serum
screening hits mothers hard, as it forces them for the first time to con-
sider that their fetus might be born disabled, or could possibly have a
condition that is incompatible with life.
Where an elevated risk is present, pregnant women most often un-
dergo a more invasive test for confirmation: chorionic villus sampling
(CVS) of the placenta during the first trimester or amniocentesis (extrac-
tion of amniotic fluid through a needle inserted into the mother’s abdo-
men) in the second.  Even deciding whether to undergo CVS or
amniocentesis can be taxing because both procedures are “invasive,”
meaning that they require collection of the fetus’s cells (rather than the
20 See, e.g., Kypros H. Nicolaides, Screening for Fetal Aneuploidies at 11 to 13 Weeks,
31 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 7, 9–10 (2011). Serum screening is most often done in conjunction
with fetal nuchal translucency (NT), a measure of the thickness of the fluid in the fetus’s neck.
Though serum screening can be performed as early as nine weeks, the optimal time for per-
forming it in conjunction with NT is 12 weeks. Id. at 10.
21 Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating Noninva-
sive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 10 (2012);
Jennifer Czerwinski et al., Maternal Serum Screening: Results Disclosure, Anxiety, & Risk
Perception, 27 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 279, 281 (2010).  Serum screening can indicate an ele-
vated risk of a number of fetal genetic abnormalities, including cystic fibrosis, Down syn-
drome, and spina bifida.
22 For Women and Their Families: A Guide to Understanding Prenatal Screening Tests
for Down Syndrome, Trisomy 18, and Open Neural Tube Defects, GENETICS EDUC. PROJECT 8
(Aug. 2007), https://www.mountsinai.on.ca/care/family-medicine-genetics-program/resources/
prenatal_screening2008.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP201.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-APR-16 10:42
2015] FOSTERING INFORMED CHOICE 301
mother’s) and accordingly carry a small risk of miscarriage.23  Where the
fetus survives, the majority of women undergoing these tests receive
good news, as no genetic abnormality can be found.  But for the small
minority who receive a confirmed diagnosis of a genetic abnormality,
CVS and amniocentesis mark the beginning of a challenging ethical and
emotional journey.
Upon confirmation of a fetal abnormality, pregnant women must
rely on medical professionals—doctors, midwives, nurses, and genetic
counselors—to help them understand both the nature of their fetus’s con-
dition and how to respond.  Unfortunately, existing research indicates
that current efforts to educate and counsel pregnant women about prena-
tal genetic abnormalities consistently come up short in providing a com-
plete picture.  Be it Down syndrome, spina bifida, cystic fibrosis or any
of the hundreds of other disorders current genetic screening and testing
are able to detect, the vast majority of diagnosed prenatal genetic condi-
tions are multivariate, can develop unpredictably, and are not fully un-
derstood, even by geneticists who have devoted their lives to studying
them.  Yet the time medical professionals spend discussing genetic anal-
ysis and potential diagnoses with pregnant women is astonishingly brief;
one study found that during initial prenatal visits, doctors and midwives
spent an average of 2.5 minutes discussing genetic counseling with wo-
men younger than 35 and 6.9 minutes discussing it with older women.24
More troubling, the subsequent confirmation of a genetic abnormal-
ity tends to be presented as a binary—the relevant test is either positive
or negative, with little explanatory nuance as to what exactly a positive
result might mean with respect to the fetus’s future quality of life.25  Can
a child with Down syndrome lead a happy life?  Can children born with
spina bifida overcome this disability and become happy, productive citi-
zens?  What is the range of outcomes for cystic fibrosis or sickle cell
anemia?  As will be shown in the following section, these questions tend
23 See R. Akolekar et al., Procedure-Related Risk of Miscarriage Following Amni-
ocentesis and Chorionic Villus Sampling: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 45 ULTRA-
SOUND OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 16, 16 (2015) (noting the oft-cited miscarriage rates of 1%
for amniocentesis and 1%–2% for CVS, but arguing that the actual procedure-related risk is far
lower).
24 Barbara A. Bernhardt et al., Prenatal Genetic Testing: Content of Discussions Be-
tween Obstetric Providers and Pregnant Women, 91 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 648, 648
(1998); cf. Philip Farrell & Norman Fost, Prenatal Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: Where Are
We Now?, 141 J. PEDIATRICS 758, 760 (2002) (noting that educating an uninformed layperson
to the point of making an informed decision about whether to undergo genetic screening for
cystic fibrosis would take “an hour or more”).
25 A number of genetic conditions can impact the fetus’s quality of potential life in a
wide array of ways, meaning that sometimes a given disorder will manifest itself through mild
or hardly discernible symptoms. See, e.g., DUSTER, supra note 19, at 53 (highlighting children R
with sickle-cell anemia as an example of disparate outcomes—some live a full life with minor
symptoms, while others experience excruciating pain and die at an early age).
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to be left unaddressed, due to the selective presentation of information
during the counseling process and the extraordinarily complicated nature
of genetic diagnoses.  Most often, rather than describing the range of
potential quality-of-life outcomes genetically anomalous fetuses might
experience, health care providers counsel patients with an emphasis on
worst-case scenarios.
The result has been that a large majority of women receiving a diag-
nosis of a genetic abnormality abort their pregnancies,26 frequently
within days, and at times in as little as twenty-four hours.27  The brevity
of this timetable is notable because it is virtually impossible to digest the
large corpus of unfamiliar, technical, scary, and potentially life-altering
information inherent in a genetic diagnosis and make an informed choice
in so short a period of time.28  It follows that many of the choices being
made are less than fully informed,29 which is particularly problematic
given the lasting impact of genetic terminations discussed in Part II.
Functioning properly, prenatal genetic counseling should serve as a
conduit, taking expectant mothers from the petrifying wilderness of a
genetic diagnosis to the informed choice that is right for them; this is the
essence of the genetic counseling’s nondirective aspiration.  But as will
be shown in the following section, genetic counseling is currently failing
expectant mothers, leading to underinformed decisions to terminate that
can produce long-standing, traumatic outcomes.
B. Underinformed Choices and the Futility of Nondirectiveness
Be it by licensed genetic counselors or otherwise,30 prenatal genetic
counseling plays a significant role in complicated pregnancies, helping
26 “[F]our of five women who learn of a diagnostic test that produces positive indications
of a genetic abnormality that will manifest symptoms choose abortion.” Id. at 70.
27 See Korenromp et al., supra note 1, at 98 (finding that women who had terminated R
pregnancies on genetic grounds did so between one and ten days of diagnosis, with an average
of 4.7 and a median of 4.4 days).
28 See RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 113 (Routledge 1999) (noting that some women, despite telling
genetic counselors that they understood what they have been told, report that they could not
follow all the words and diagrams being used to explain genetics and the risk of disorders).
29 See Farrell & Fost, supra note 24, at 761 (“In the best circumstances, there are still R
likely to be couples who will misunderstand and make reproductive decisions contrary to their
own desires.”).
30 Access to counselors who are members of the National Society of Genetic Counselors
(NSGC) varies considerably, as they tend to be concentrated in certain large cities. See
Kathryn Schleckser, Note, Physician Participation in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing:
Pragmatism or Paternalism?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 695, 725–26 (2013) (describing the high
concentration of NSGC-member genetic counselors in urban areas such as New York, Phila-
delphia, and San Francisco and their relative dearth in and around cities such as New Orleans,
Boise, and Fargo).  Moreover, a recent search on the web page of the American Board of
Genetic Counseling, the field’s accrediting body, found that there are just twelve certified
genetic counselors in Idaho (eleven of whom are in Boise), five in Mississippi, two in Wyo-
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women determine which form of genetic analysis is right for them and
interpret screening or testing results.  Upon detection of a fetal anomaly,
counselors help women decide whether to terminate the pregnancy,31
treat the fetus in utero, or manage the pregnancy and delivery with an eye
toward raising a child with a potential disability.32  Unlike obstetricians
and other health care professionals—who are often minimally trained
and inadequately prepared to counsel patients in this manner (though
they often do)33—licensed genetic counselors are required to undergo
two years of masters-level training designed to enable them to inform
and counsel patients navigating their way through the numerous medical,
ethical, and psychological issues at play in this realm.34
In accordance with prevailing norms of nondirectiveness,35 genetic
counselors and others providing prenatal genetic counseling endeavor to
avoid or downplay the social and political implications of the informa-
tion they provide.  Instead, genetic counselors emphasize their technical
competence36 in an effort to maintain the objective and scientific charac-
ter of their communications.  Genetic counselors generally provide pa-
tients with the data and risk considerations of the disorder, followed by
open-ended questions (“How do you feel about those numbers?”) and
active listening (“I hear you saying that you could/could not handle a
child like that”).37  In this regard, counselors play a dual role, acting as
both information-giver and counselor.38
Beyond these basic parameters, however, the manner in which ge-
netic counseling plays out in practice varies considerably, as counseling
must in each instance be tailored to a wide range of patient backgrounds
and needs.39  The combination of the counselor’s dual role and the cul-
tural, religious, racial, intellectual, and economic diversity of the patient
ming, and one in West Virginia. See Find a Counselor, AM. BD. OF GENETIC COUNSELING,
INC., https://abgcmember.goamp.com/net/ABGCwcm/Find_Counselor/ABGCwcm/Con-
tact_Management/FindCounselor.aspx?hkey=94273207-1a6e-4c6d-ac24-0c6b3793c8cd (last
visited, Aug. 4, 2015).
31 For a more complete historiography on the development of the genetic counselor, see
RAPP, supra note 28, at 56–62. R
32 Rachel Rebouche´ and Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prena-
tal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 990 (2012); DUSTER, supra note 19, at 69 R
(“The counselor primarily provides information, elaborates options, answers complicated ge-
netic questions, explains risk figures and probabilities, and offers a measure of emotional sup-
port and understanding.  The counselor, according to ideology, does not hint, cajole or try to
influence in a direction that is against the indications of the counselee.”).
33 Rebouche´ & Rothenberg, supra note 32, at 990. R
34 RAPP, supra note 28, at 56–57. R
35 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
36 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 79. R
37 RAPP, supra note 28, at 59. R
38 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 83. R
39 Id. at 172 (“On the one hand, each counseling session is a unique configuration of
personal experience, of familial and peer pressures . . . of religious and spiritual beliefs . . . of
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population produces a matrix of possibilities that renders it impossible to
develop a single, generally-applicable set of best practices for adminis-
tering counseling in a manner that is truly nondirective.40  A Catholic,
young, wealthy white couple carrying a child with spina bifida, for ex-
ample, is likely to enter a genetic counseling session with a different
perspective and different concerns than an older, nonreligious, Latino
couple of more limited means.
Given the diversity of the patient population and the inherent sub-
jectivity of genetic counseling, it should come as no surprise that few
parents experiencing prenatal genetic counseling find it to be neutral.41
Despite counselors’ intent and their nondirective aspirations, “neutrality
is virtually impossible” because “social values and priorities . . . are em-
bedded in medical institutions and frameworks” and “insistence on im-
partiality can ultimately frustrate patients, some of whom want to receive
expert advice from genetic practitioners.”42  Not surprisingly, a genetic
counselor’s experience and background “will often determine whether
the disorder will be explained to the patient in positive or negative
terms.”43  There are even some counselors who “display surprise or dis-
tress upon hearing that a woman wants to bring to term a fetus identified
as having a disability,”44 regardless of a patient’s beliefs and available
resources.  The result has been that despite—or perhaps because of—due
consideration of the individual needs and background of each patient,
“most clients seeking genetic counseling in conjunction with predictive
testing will be given directive counseling,”45 in large part because, as
counselors themselves acknowledge, “staying in neutral is often a diffi-
cult task.”46
Though clear-cut advice is forbidden,47 genetic counselors manage
to counsel their patients directively in a number of ways.  When asked
“What do you think I should do?”—an inquiry occurring on average over
connections of specific histories to the genetic disease . . . and, of course, the social and
cultural meanings attached to each [disorder].”).
40 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 82. R
41 See, e.g., Barbara A. Bernhardt, Empirical Evidence that Genetic Counseling Is Direc-
tive: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 17, 19 (1997); Susan Michie et
al., Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling: An Empirical Study, 60 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
40 (1997).
42 ALEXANDRA M. STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREED-
ING IN MODERN AMERICA 213 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
43 Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and Man-
aged Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 862 (1999).
44 Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING & DISABILITY RIGHTS 33,
(Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., Georgetown Univ. Press 2000).
45 Bernhardt, supra note 41, at 18. R
46 See RAPP, supra note 28, at 94. R
47 STERN, supra note 42, at 213. R
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five times during each counseling session48—it becomes increasingly
difficult over time for counselors to side-step the question and emphasize
that it is the patient’s personal decision.49  Instead, counselors may “se-
lectively reinforce” a patient’s perceived inclination or general attitude,50
“choose not to disclose certain information,” or “suggest what [he or] she
considers the ‘most appropriate’ course of action for the patient under the
circumstances.”51
This is not to fault genetic counselors, for the circumstances under
which prenatal genetic counseling must take place render true nondirec-
tiveness all but impossible.  Given the sheer volume of information that
could be conveyed to an expectant mother learning of a fetal abnormality
and limited time, the counselor must be selective as to which information
she presents.  In determining which information to present, counselors
must weigh what they perceive to be the potential personal impact (the
ability of patients to cope with adversity given the relative strength of
their support network), economic impact (the ability of patients to afford
caring for a child with a genetic disorder), and social impact (the stigma
that comes along with terminating pregnancy or caring for a child with a
genetic disorder) in order to help them decide how to proceed.52
Factoring in each of these concerns manifests itself in the form of
deciding not only “what information is included in a consultation,” but
also how to frame the facts presented.53  Indeed, it is now clear that “cul-
tural, socioeconomic, educational, and ethical factors significantly affect
the way counselors describe genetic disorders and their possible out-
comes.”54  One result of this selective approach has been that the choices
of individuals are in some instances all but “preconstructed by the cate-
gories of disease” affecting the fetus.55  Such preconstruction is diametri-
cally opposed to the nondirectiveness that should characterize prenatal
genetic counseling.
48 Bernhardt, supra note 41, at 17. R
49 See RAPP, supra note 28, at 96–100. R
50 Bernhardt, supra note 41, at 17. R
51 Alan J. Belsky, Injury As A Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life
Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 268 n.196 (1993) (“The counselor may well justify
nondisclosure of certain diagnoses on the assumption that the parents, upon receipt of such
information, may decide ‘unreasonably’ to abort the fetus.”).
52 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 82–83. R
53 Bernhardt, supra note 41, at 18 (“Genetic counselors always have the power to influ- R
ence clients by choosing to discuss one aspect of a situation while ignoring or downplaying
another.”).
54 Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and Man-
aged Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 862 (1999) (emphasis added).
55 See Evelyn Fox Kelly, Nature, Nurture, and the Human Genome Project, in THE
CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 296 (Daniel
J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
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The challenges of prenatal genetic counseling do not end there. Re-
gardless of which information counselors choose to present, there re-
mains a no less important concern that expectant mothers often fail to
grasp the limited information they do receive due to its complexity. This
is a particular concern for less educated pregnant women because coun-
selors tend to “communicate very similar content across cases, as if [the]
variability and uniqueness [of each session] were momentarily suspended
or ‘bracketed.’”56  Some patients, despite politely feigning understanding
during the counseling session, later report that they could not follow all
the words and diagrams being used to explain genetics and the risk of
disorders.57  In one study, as many as 30% of counselees could not recall
crucial risk figures that counselors presented during consultation,58
which suggests that nearly a third of these patients made a less than fully
informed reproductive choice.
This comprehension gap arises out of both the inadequacy of the
literature and communication provided and the patients’ tendency to
blame themselves for not understanding the complicated information
presented to them.59  The content of the counseling session is by its na-
ture overwhelming, and it tends to be conveyed in a manner that is anti-
thetical to comprehension, “muted by the professionalism of the
bureaucratic style of communication.”60  But regardless of its source, the
gap between what counselors say and what patients hear is now well
established and, given the stakes, should be cause for great concern.
It should now be clear that the selective presentation of information
based on counselors’ preconceptions of the disorder at issue and patient
characteristics—coupled with the failure of many counselees to under-
stand the information presented to them—has made it so that women
frequently make underinformed choices regarding genetic abortions. And
given the widely recognized near impossibility of nondirectiveness de-
scribed above, it should be equally clear that prenatal genetic counseling
is often directive61—albeit to varying degrees—and at times can act to
encourage the termination of genetically anomalous fetuses.  To be sure,
some women make the choice that is right for them despite being under-
informed and receiving directive counseling.  But others do not.  The fol-
lowing Part focuses on the experience of those who choose to terminate
on genetic grounds, highlighting the unique and troubling psychological
56 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 172. R
57 See Rapp, supra note 28, at 113. R
58 PETER D. TURNPENNY & SIAN ELLARD, EMERY’S ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETICS
268 (14th ed. 2011).
59 See RAPP, supra note 28, at 113. R
60 DUSTER, supra note 19, at 173. R
61 TURNPENNY & ELLARD, supra note 58, at 268 (noting that of couples attending genetic R
counseling, “approximately 50% have been influenced to some extent”).
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impacts these abortions have on the women who have them and their
families.  This trauma is perhaps the greatest cost of prenatal genetic
counseling in its current form and serves as the basis for the reforms set
forth in Part V of this Article.
II. THE UNIQUE IMPACT OF GENETIC TERMINATIONS
It bears repeating that a pregnant woman learning of a prenatal ge-
netic abnormality usually opts to abort the pregnancy,62 and does so
within an average of under five days.63  Usually occurring during the
second trimester, a genetic termination is distinct from the vast majority
of traditional abortions both in timing and, more importantly, “in that it is
an initially wanted pregnancy.”64  Put differently, pregnant women con-
sidering genetic abortions have already declined to terminate and have
begun preparing to bring a child into the world.  The jarring discovery of
a fetal abnormality forces these women into an unwelcome and uncom-
fortable revisitation of the abortion question, and, as will be shown be-
low, when women choose to abort on genetic grounds, it is “much more
difficult to handle emotionally, psychologically, and physiologically.”65
In this regard, it is the nature of the termination rather than its timing that
is most significant—even where the abortion takes place relatively early,
feelings of guilt, failure, genetic inferiority, revulsion, fear, grief, help-
lessness, depression, and doubt about the correctness of the decision can
engulf women who terminate on genetic grounds.66
Stillbirth is perhaps a better analogue to genetic terminations: in
both cases there is a wanted pregnancy ending in fetal demise and result-
ing in a profound sense of loss that tends to resonate to a greater degree
than the termination of an unwanted pregnancy.  But genetic termina-
tions are unlike stillbirth in that the mother (rather than incompatibility
with life) decides the ultimate fate of the fetus.67  This distinction is sig-
nificant because women choosing to terminate on genetic grounds pos-
sess an agency that can be informed by prenatal genetic counseling so as
to mitigate and perhaps overcome the profound loss many of them expe-
rience.  For them, unlike those stricken with a stillborn child, there is
hope.
62 See DUSTER, supra note 19, at 70 (“[F]our of five women who learn of a diagnostic R
test that produces positive indications of a genetic abnormality that will manifest symptoms
choose abortion.”).
63 See Korenromp et al., supra note 1, at 98–99. R
64 Id. at 95.
65 See DUSTER, supra note 19, at 179. R
66 See Korenromp et al., supra note 1, at 100–02; see also id. at 104 (“Even if the preg- R
nancy is terminated at an early stage, the parents have to cope with the loss of a child and the
loss of an envisaged future.”).
67 See id. at 95.
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The unique trauma experienced by women who terminate on ge-
netic grounds is well documented in the literature.  Termination of preg-
nancy due to a fetal anomaly has been described as a “major life event”
for almost all women68 and a “traumatic life event with high psychologi-
cal impact,”69 “commensurate with those experienced over the loss of a
spouse, a parent, or a child.”70  After termination, it is not uncommon for
women to second-guess their choice, and in one study “nearly all the
women . . . report[ed] feelings of wanting to die” in the weeks following
the procedure.71
There are three reasons why the psychological impact of these ter-
minations is so severe.  First, there is the sense of agency referenced
above.  Unlike a stillbirth or other perinatal loss, it is the mother who
decides to end the life of her initially wanted fetus.  As one study ex-
plains, “genetic abortions are especially poignant because the parents
take an active part in the baby’s death.”72
Second, women who terminate on genetic grounds experience a se-
vere sense of isolation, finding it difficult to discuss their experience with
even their closest friends and loved ones.  The poles of the abortion de-
bate help to frame this isolation: “The pro-choice group cannot accept
the love the woman feels for the entity she calls her ‘baby’; the pro-life
group cannot condone the woman’s willingness to terminate the preg-
nancy.”73  Because a genetic termination does not fit within the tradi-
tional abortion narrative, women find themselves with “little support and
68 See, e.g., Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Long-term Psychological Consequences of
Pregnancy Termination for Fetal Abnormality: A Cross-sectional Study, 25 PRENATAL DIAG-
NOSIS 253 (2005); Anette Kersting et al., Psychological Impact on Women After Second and
Third Trimester Termination of Pregnancy Due to Fetal Anomalies Versus Women After
Preterm Birth—A 14-month Follow up Study, 12 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 193,
200 (2009).
69 Anette Kersting & Birgit Wagner, Complicated Grief After Perinatal Loss, 14 DIA-
LOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 190 (2012); see also K.A. Salvesen et al., Comparison of
Long-term Psychological Responses of Women After Pregnancy Termination Due to Fetal
Abnormalities and After Perinatal Loss, 9 ULTRASOUND OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 83–84
(1997) (noting that by one measure the acute psychological response to a termination due to
fetal anomaly is comparable to the response to a diagnosis of breast cancer or being raped).
70 ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION: THE
MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT 161 (2002) (quoting Mary Seller et al., Grief and Mid-
Trimester Fetal Loss, 13 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 341, 346 (1993)).
71 Judith L.M. McCoyd, Pregnancy Interrupted: Loss a Desired Pregnancy After Diag-
nosis of Fetal Anomaly, 28 J PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 37, 45 (2007).
72 RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 160–61 (quoting Aliza Kolker & B. R
Meredith Burke, Grieving the Wanted Child: Ramifications of Abortion After Prenatal Diag-
nosis of Abnormality, 14 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 513, 524 (1993); see also id. at 161
(quoting Bruce D. Blumberg et al., The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion Performed for a
Genetic Indication, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 799, 805 (1975)) (highlighting
“the role of decision making and the responsibility associated with selective abortion” as fac-
tors perhaps explaining “the more serious depression” after genetic terminations).
73 McCoyd, supra note 71, at 43. R
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no advocacy group to embrace the sort of ‘choice’ they must make.”74
All too often they experience this unique suffering alone.  One result of
this isolation is that some women who do seek support simply lie, telling
those around them that they lost their fetus to a miscarriage rather than a
genetic abortion.75
Third, and related to the first two, there is an overriding sense of
guilt and shame that accompanies genetic terminations.  This can take
two forms.  On one hand, “there is a sense of failure elicited by the fact
of the fetal anomaly.  Parents may feel that they are to blame for their
child’s imperfection.”76  On the other hand is the “guilt generated by
having made the decision to terminate the pregnancy.”77
The combined impact of these three factors—agency, isolation, and
guilt—has been a persistent finding of notably high rates of grief, depres-
sion, and post-traumatic stress in women who terminate their pregnancies
because of a fetal abnormality.  The grief women experience is extraordi-
nary, rising for some to the level of clinical diagnoses of “complicated
grief”78 or persisting to the point of becoming “pathological.”79  Grief
rising to this level is characteristically “intense,” lasts “longer than would
be expected according to social norms,” and “causes impairment in daily
functioning.”80  It is also associated with “sleep disturbance, substance
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Emma F. France et al., What Parents Say About Disclosing the End of Their
Pregnancy Due to Fetal Abnormality, 29 MIDWIFERY 24, 30 (2013) (“Most parents were selec-
tive in who they told they had terminated the pregnancy because of a fetal abnormality, telling
less close friends and acquaintances that they had had a miscarriage or that the baby had
died.”); Kersting & Wagner, supra note 69, at 190 (“As some people may experience condem- R
nation by sections of society that do not approve of the decision to terminate, a number of
families decide to pretend that the loss was due to a miscarriage.”) (quoting Euna M. August et
al., Infant Mortality and Subsequent Risk of Stillbirth: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 118
BJOG 1636 (2011)); RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 162 (noting that “many R
women are reluctant to admit that they have had a genetic abortion and will tell relatives and
friends they have had a miscarriage instead”) (citing Seller et al., supra note 70, at 343). R
76 RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 162 (citing one study finding that 61% of R
women and 32% of men felt this way and another finding that 43% of women do).
77 Id. (citing a study finding that 40% of women and 9% of men feel this way).
78 Kersting & Wagner, supra note 69, at 190 (noting that complicated grief has “been R
documented in parents years after a termination on the grounds of abnormality”). Complicated
grief is “unusually severe and prolonged, and it impairs function in important domains.” M.
Katherine Shear, Complicated Grief, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 153, 154 (2015).  Its characteris-
tic symptoms include “intense yearning, longing, or emotional pain, frequently preoccupying
thoughts and memories of the deceased person, a feeling of disbelief or an inability to accept
the loss, and difficulty imagining a meaningful future without the deceased person.” Id.
79 Kersting & Wagner, supra note 69, at 191 (“Pathological grief was found to be partic- R
ularly high in women after termination of an abnormal pregnancy.”). But see Kathleen Keefe-
Cooperman, A Comparison of Grief as Related to Miscarriage and Termination for Fetal
Abnormality, 50 OMEGA: J. DEATH & DYING 281, 297 (2005) (finding that women who termi-
nate due to a fetal abnormality do not manifest worse grief symptoms than those who experi-
ence a miscarriage).
80 Shear, supra note 78, at 154. R
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abuse, suicidal thinking and behavior, and abnormalities in immune
functions.”81  These grief symptoms can be compounded in women who
have had genetic abortions, some of whom feel they are not entitled to
the grief they are experiencing because it is a direct result of their
decision.82
Women who terminate due to a fetal abnormality also experience
high levels of depression,83 which generally entails “the presence of sad,
empty, or irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive changes
that significantly affect [their] capacity to function.”84  This depression
can be short-lived, or can persist for many years after termination.85  But
regardless of duration, the depression women experience after genetic
terminations has been noted across the literature86 and remains a com-
mon risk factor.
Lastly, the most significant outcome for these women found in the
literature is a high rate of post-traumatic stress. Post-traumatic stress is a
familiar outcome for combat veterans and victims of rape or sexual as-
sault, torture, terrorist attack, or natural disaster.87  The symptoms of
post-traumatic stress vary, but can include recurrent, intrusive memories
of the traumatic event, flashbacks in which the individual relives the
event, and adverse psychological and physiological reactions upon expo-
sure to cues that resemble or symbolize the event.88
Mothers often experience the death of a fetus by way of a termina-
tion for a fetal abnormality more of a trauma than a loss.89  The resultant
post-traumatic stress occurs at an alarmingly high rate.  One study found
81 Id.
82 See McCoyd, supra note 71, at 45 (citing KENNETH J. DOKA, DISENFRANCHISED R
GRIEF: RECOGNIZING HIDDEN SORROW 368 (1989)).
83 RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 162 (observing that “following a genetic R
abortion,” depression is “very common”) (citing P. Donnai et al., Attitudes of Patients After
“Genetic” Termination of Pregnancy, 282 BRITISH MED. J. 621, 622 (1981); Blumberg et al.,
supra note 72, at 805); see also id. (speculating that, factoring in the likely high rate of denial R
in self reporting, the incidence of depression following a selective abortion may be as high as
92% for women and 82% for men) (citing Blumberg et al., supra note 72, at 805). R
84 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 155 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
85 See Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Psychological Consequences of Termination of Preg-
nancy for Fetal Anomaly: Similarities and Differences Between Partners, 25 PRENATAL DIAG-
NOSIS 1226, 1231 (2005).
86 See, e.g., Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Adjustment to Termination of Pregnancy for
Fetal Anomaly: A Longitudinal Study in Women at 4, 8, and 16 Months, 201 AM. J. OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY 160.e1, 160.e3 (2009) (finding rates of depression of 27.9%, 19.7%, and
13.1% at 4, 8, and 16 months after termination, respectively); Kersting et al., supra note 68, at R
199 (finding that women who terminate due to fetal anomalies in the second or third trimester
score high for depressive symptoms fourteen months after termination).
87 DSM-V, supra note 84, at 274. R
88 Id. at 271.
89 See Korenromp et al., supra note 68, at 259 (observing that “in the long term, women R
apparently experience [termination of pregnancy for fetal abnormality] more as a trauma than
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that post-traumatic stress was exhibited by 45% of women 14 days after
termination, 35.3% six months after termination, and nearly one in three
(30.9%) fourteen months after termination.90  These numbers far exceed
the respective figures for women experiencing pre-term birth (25.8%,
22%, and 21%) and women who had delivered a healthy child (7.7%,
3.9%, and 4.3%).91  Another study at four months after termination
found the rate of post-traumatic stress symptoms for women who had
terminated for fetal anomalies to be 44%, ten times higher than after a
normal delivery.92
These post-termination outcomes are not limited to expecting
mothers; fathers and living children experience psychological impacts
from genetic terminations as well.  Though generally manifesting symp-
toms at a lower rate than their partners, men also suffer from grief,93
depression,94 and post-traumatic stress95 after genetic terminations.
Moreover, some men find it “harder to access emotional support” than
their partners “because of expectations about how men ‘should’ deal with
emotions and the stigma of public displays of distress by men,” which in
turn begets a greater sense of isolation that can have a negative impact on
their emotional health.96  Men also report “that nobody asked them how
they felt or how they were coping” after termination,97 and because they
often focus their attention on supporting their partners (and families),
men tend to suppress their feelings throughout this traumatic
experience.98
as a loss”); Korenromp et al., supra note 85, at 1231 (finding that both women and men R
experienced fetal terminations “more as a trauma than as a loss event”).
90 Kersting et al., supra note 68, at 198. R
91 Id.
92 Marijke J. Korenromp et al., A Prospective Study on Parental Coping 4 Months After
Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Anomalies, 27 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 709, 712 (2007).
93 See id. (finding symptoms of grief in 2.4% of men—compared to 9.7% of women—
four months after termination).
94 See id. (finding symptoms of depression in 15.8% of men—compared to 28.2% of
women—four months after termination).
95 See id. (finding symptoms of post-traumatic stress in 21.6% of men—compared to
44% of women—four months after termination).
96 France et al., supra note 75, at 31; see also Fiona M. Robson, “Yes!—A Chance to Tell R
My Side of the Story”: A Case Study of a Male Partner of a Woman Undergoing Termination
for a Fetal Abnormality, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 183, 190 (2002) (“The resulting lack of social
support can complicate the grieving process and can become more intensified because of the
expectation of stoicism in the male gender, in addition to the social expectations that men
should not grieve openly.”).
97 Robson, supra note 96, at 190 (citing F.A. Murphy, The Experience of Early Miscar- R
riage from a Male Perspective, 7 J. CLINICAL NURSING 325 (1998); M. White-Van Mourik,
The Psychological Sequelae of a Second-Trimester Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnor-
mality, 12 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 189 (1992)).
98 See Robson, supra note 96, at 191. R
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Finally, children learning of the death of what was to become their
little brother or sister also suffer. Because they have trouble separating
“the concept of ‘fetus’ from the concept of ‘baby,’” young children, una-
ble to comprehend the complexity of their parents’ decision, mourn the
loss as they would mourn the loss of a living baby.99  Psychological im-
pacts on children have been noted whether parents provide a partial
(omitting discussion of the parents’ choice) or complete explanation of
the circumstances of the fetal demise.100  Even where parents provide no
explanation of the loss to their very young children, there can be behav-
ioral changes, such as motor regression.101  And regardless of what they
are told, some children experience adverse effects of their parents’ anxi-
ety and distress as they cope with the termination.102
As this section has shown, women who terminate their pregnancies
because of a fetal abnormality experience elevated rates of significant
psychological outcomes, namely grief, depression, and post-traumatic
stress. In this regard, these abortions are unlike abortions of unwanted
pregnancies (the vast majority), which have relatively minor psychologi-
cal impacts.103  Though similar to stillbirth because in both cases a
wanted child does not come into being, genetic terminations are distinct
in that the parents must assent to the fetus’s demise, which results in a
greater sense of isolation and guilt. And although would-be mothers bear
the brunt of the psychological impact after termination, their partners and
children are not exempt.
These severe psychological outcomes underscore the significance of
the decision whether to terminate for a fetal abnormality.  Despite its best
intentions—and often for good reason—prenatal genetic counseling does
not adequately prepare women for the magnitude and consequences of
the decision that they must make.  Picking up on this observation, Con-
gress and several states have passed legislation in recent years aimed at
providing better information for women in this predicament.  The follow-
ing Part discusses these legislative responses and explains why they do
not go far enough.
99 RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 164. R
100 In one study, children receiving a partial explanation “expressed sadness, disappoint-
ment, and guilt.” Id.  Older children receiving a complete explanation had “marked and dis-
turbing reactions.”  Id.
101 Id.
102 See France et al., supra note 75, at 31; RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at R
164.
103 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. R
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III. FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES
A. Federal Response: the PPDCAA
In recognition of the continued growth of prenatal genetic analysis
and the inadequacies of the information and support women carrying ge-
netically anomalous fetuses receive, Congress passed the Prenatally and
Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act (PPDCAA) in 2008.
Signed into law by President Bush in October of that year, the Act has
three stated purposes:
(1) increase patient referrals to providers of key support
services for women who have received a positive diag-
nosis for Down syndrome, or other prenatally or
postnatally diagnosed conditions, as well as to provide
up-to-date information on the range of outcomes for in-
dividuals living with the diagnosed condition, including
physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial
outcomes;
(2) strengthen existing networks of support through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Health
Resources and Services Administration, and other pa-
tient and provider outreach programs; and
(3) ensure that patients receive up-to-date, evidence-
based information about the accuracy of the test.104
In order to accomplish these goals—the common theme of which is to
provide prospective parents with accurate information in order to allow
them to make informed decisions about raising children with genetic dis-
orders105—the Act empowers the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services to authorize and oversee certain activities by the
heads of the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, or Health Resources and Services Administration.106  In-
cluded among these activities are the collection and dissemination of cur-
rent, evidence-based information about genetic disorders and the
coordination of access to supportive services for families of patients with
genetic diagnoses.107
104 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No.
110–374, § 2(1)–(3), 122 Stat. 4051, 4051 (2008) (emphasis added).
105 See Rebouche´ & Rothenberg, supra note 32, at 993 (2013) (citing John F. Muller, R
Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 477 (2011)).
106 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(b)(1) (2012).
107 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). The suggested means of doing so under the
PPDCAA include telephone hotlines, improved outreach and peer-to-peer counseling pro-
grams, the creation of national or local registries of families willing to adopt children with
genetic disorders, and the establishment of education services for medical professionals who
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The PPDCAA’s goal of providing accurate, up-to-date, and bal-
anced information to prospective and current parents of children with
genetic disorders drew bipartisan support.  Raised in the Senate by Sena-
tors Brownback and Kennedy—as strange bedfellows as one could imag-
ine—the PPDCAA worked its way through both houses of Congress the
same week108 and was signed into law just two weeks later.109  But the
Act did not emerge from the legislative process unscathed.  Whereas an
earlier version included a request for $5 million of funding to support its
objectives,110 the PPDCAA as passed contained no funding provision. To
date, it has been funded at only a fraction of the requested amount,111 and
it has had minimal impact in providing families with the essential infor-
mation of its aim.  Though Congress should be applauded for acknowl-
edging the importance of filling the significant gaps in the information
women carrying genetically anomalous fetuses currently receive, the un-
derfunding of the PPDCAA represents a missed opportunity to address
this important need.112
B. State Responses
In addition to the federal effort embodied in the PPDCAA, eleven
states have enacted measures aimed at providing the most current, evi-
dence-based information regarding prenatally (and postnatally) diag-
nosed genetic conditions, such as Down syndrome, and offering various
provide, interpret, or inform parents of the results of prenatal genetic diagnostics. Id. § 280g-
8(b)(1)(B)(i)–(v).
108 See 154 CONG. REC. S9341 (Sept. 23, 2008) (showing that the bill passed in the Senate
by unanimous consent on September 23, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H9920 (Sept. 25, 2008)
(showing that it passed in the House on September 25, 2008 under a suspension of the rules, a
procedure for bills having at least a 2/3 majority of support).
109 122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (showing that the Act was signed into the law on October 8,
2008).
110 See Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th
Cong. (as introduced July 18, 2007).
111 See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 2012: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. of Appropria-
tions, Part 2B, 112th Cong. 1128 (2011) (showing that measures relating to the PPDCAA have
received funding of $1,000,000 in FY 2009, $499,000 in FY 2010, and $500,000 in FY 2011);
HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2012 JUSTIFICATION
OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 235, http://www.hrsa.gov/about/budget/
budgetjustification2012.pdf (showing DHHS’s ultimately unfunded request for $499,000 in
FY 2012); HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2013
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 35–38, 382, http://www.hrsa
.gov/about/budget/budgetjustification2013.pdf (listing “congenital disabilities” under the PPD-
CAA as an “unfunded authorization” for FY 2013 and noting that the “program was discontin-
ued in fiscal year 2011”).
112 For a more detailed discussion of the PPDCAA’s shortcomings and areas of potential
improvement, see Part V.A.
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support services.113  The diversity of states passing such legislation—
which include liberal strongholds Massachusetts and Maryland, tradi-
tional swing states Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, and Virginia, and deeply
conservative Kentucky, Kansas, and Louisiana—indicates that fostering
greater understanding of prenatally diagnosed conditions, and providing
adequate support, is an issue of bipartisan concern.114  That nine of the
eleven states have passed pro-information legislation since 2012,115 and
in response to the PPDCAA’s shortcomings,116 indicates that fostering
improved distribution of information to women considering their repro-
ductive choices after learning of a fetal anomaly is an emergent topic
drawing increasing legislative attention in the states.
A recent piece of state legislation, Ohio’s Down Syndrome Informa-
tion Act (DSIA), provides an illustrative example. Enacted in December
113 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.69 (2014); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6244
(2014); FLA. STAT. § 383.141 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70H (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 801B (2014); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-1502 (2014); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.392 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.192 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-1,259 (2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.923 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01 (2008).
Two other states, New Jersey and Oklahoma, also have similar pending legislation.  In
Oklahoma, the bill was introduced in February 2013, but there has not been any activity since
it was referred to committee. See S.B. 586, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013).  In New Jersey,
a bill was introduced on May 22, 2014, and there has not been any update on the bill since that
time. See Assem. B. 3233, 216th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2014).
114 To take the two most recent examples, Pennsylvania passed the Down Syndrome Pre-
natal and Postnatal Education Act by a vote of 50-0 in the Senate and a 196-4 vote in the
House. See House Roll Calls; House of Representatives Session of 2013–2014 Regular Ses-
sion; PA. HOUSE OF REPS., http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/RC/Public/rc_view_ac
tion2.cfm?sess_yr=2013&sess_ind=0&rc_body=H&rc_nbr=1592 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016);
Senate Roll Calls, Senate of Pennsylvania Session of 2013–2014 Regular Session, PA. STATE
SENATE, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/RC/Public/rc_view_action2.cfm?sess_yr
=2013&sess_ind=0&rc_body=S&rc_nbr=660 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).  And, Ohio’s Down
Syndrome Information Act passed with no opposing votes. See Unofficial Votes for House
Bill 552, OHIO GEN. ASSEMB. ARCHIVES, http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/votes.cfm?ID=
130_HB_552 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
115 Massachusetts led the way in 2012, followed by Florida (2012), Kansas and Kentucky
(2013), and Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio (2014).  The other two
states, Virginia and Missouri, passed their legislation in 2007.
116 Christine Williams, State Law Provides Information, Support After Down Syndrome
Diagnosis: Massachusetts Legislation Could Be Model for Giving Help to Parents of Children
with Down Syndrome, OUR SUNDAY VISITOR (Oct. 17, 2012), https://www.osv.com/OSVNew-
sweekly/ByIssue/Article/TabId/735/ArtMID/13636/ArticleID/9031/State-law-provides-infor-
mation-support-after-Down-syndrome-diagnosis.aspx#sthash.wT76GhPt.dpuf (outlining that
the original intent behind the Massachusetts law, which propelled the state law movement, was
to “augment the federal legislation”); Questioning Objections to Chloe’s Law, JEROME
LEJEUNE FOUND. (June 29, 2014), http://lejeuneusa.org/node/608#.VKtVWivF-Sr (“The need
for Chloe’s law is two-fold: [1] the Kennedy-Brownback Act has never been funded or imple-
mented, which is why states have taken on state-level measures; and [2] while professional
guidelines recommend offering prenatal testing for Down syndrome to all patients, those same
guidelines recommend that patients receive up-to-date, accurate information about Down syn-
drome and referral to parent support organizations, but that is not happening with the same
regularity as the offering of prenatal testing.”).
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of 2014, the DSIA empowers Ohio’s department of health to create a
current, evidence-based Down syndrome information sheet that includes:
a description of the syndrome, “including its causes, effects on develop-
ment, and potential complications”; diagnostic tests available; treatment
and therapy options; and contact information for organizations that pro-
vide Down syndrome support and educational services at the national,
state, and local level.117  The DSIA further provides that the information
sheet shall be made available on the department of health’s website, and
that copies of it shall be distributed to any patient under the care of state-
licensed health care professionals or facilities who receives a test result
indicating, or a diagnosis of, Down syndrome.118
Six states—Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Louisiana, Ken-
tucky, and Massachusetts—take an approach similar to Ohio’s in that
they address their legislation specifically to Down syndrome and focus
on the collection and distribution of certain information about the condi-
tion and support services available.119  There are, however, some notable
distinctions. Kentucky’s statute, for example, addresses itself to both
Down syndrome and spina bifida.120  Maryland, though requiring that its
health department gather relevant information and distribute it to all ap-
plicable health care providers and facilities, crucially leaves to the de-
partment’s discretion whether to provide that information to expectant
parents receiving a Down syndrome diagnosis.121  And Louisiana, re-
flecting its conservative political climate, explicitly bars any mention of
abortion as a “neutral or acceptable option” in the Down syndrome
materials it requires expectant mothers to receive.122  Despite these dis-
tinctions, each of these seven states has taken the same general approach
aimed at providing more accurate and balanced information to women
considering terminating their pregnancies because of Down syndrome.
Four states—Kansas, Missouri, Virginia, and Florida—have taken a
broader approach, addressing their legislation more generally to condi-
tions diagnosed prenatally, postnatally, or both.  In this regard, they are
117 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.69(A)(1)–(2) (2014).
118 Id. § 3701.69(B) (2014).  The health care professionals covered are physicians, nurse-
midwives, genetic counselors, hospitals, maternity units, newborn care nurseries, maternity
homes, and birthing centers. Id.
119 See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6244 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
1502 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 801B (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.392
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.192 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 111 § 70H
(2012).
120 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.192 (2013).
121 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-1502(C)(1) (2014) (“On receipt of a positive test
result from a test for Down syndrome, a health care facility or health care provider may pro-
vide to the expectant parent who receives a prenatal test result for Down syndrome or the
parent of the child diagnosed with Down syndrome the written information provided or made
available by the Department under subsection (b) of this section.”) (emphasis added).
122 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.392(A)(3) (2014).
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more closely aligned with the federal PPDCAA than the Down-syn-
drome-specific legislation in the seven states described above. Kansas’s
legislation is potentially the most robust and contains elements that can
serve as a model for other states.  It speaks specifically to the collection
and dissemination of “evidence-based information” about “Down syn-
drome and other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions” and the
provision of “new or existing supportive services,” including outreach
programs to provide expecting parents with the “range of outcomes for
individuals living with the diagnosed condition,” the development of “lo-
cal peer support programs to effectively serve women” who receive a
diagnosis, and the establishment of a “network of local registries of fami-
lies willing to adopt newborns with Down syndrome or other prenatally
or postnatally diagnosed conditions.”123  Unfortunately, none of these
steps are required under Kansas’s legislation; their creation and imple-
mentation are at the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Environment.124
The three other states that have not taken a Down-centric approach
have statutes that reflect similar concerns, but are less specific than Kan-
sas’s. Missouri’s legislation, relating only to prenatally diagnosed condi-
tions, requires that health care professionals provide parents with
relevant medical and testing information as well as information regarding
“resources for obtaining support services for such conditions,” including
“support programs for parents and families.”125  Florida imposes similar
requirements.126 Virginia’s legislation, though broad in scope—covering
“any fetal health condition identified by prenatal genetic testing or prena-
tal screening procedures”—requires only that medical information be
provided to the parents.127  Referrals to “support service providers,” in-
cluding “education and support programs,” are discretionary.128
Taken as a whole, these eleven state statutes address similar con-
cerns pertaining to the inadequacy of information pregnant women re-
ceive upon learning of a fetal abnormality and considering terminating
their pregnancies.129  That overall more than one in five states have
123 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,259(a) (2013).
124 Id.
125 MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923(3) (2007).
126 See FLA. STAT. § 383.141(2) (2012).
127 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01(B) (2008).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Marshall, Representative, to members of the Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.legis.state.pa.us//cfdocs/Legis/
CSM/showMemoPublic.cfm?chamber=H&SPick=20130&cosponId=14261 (declaring that
Pennsylvania’s legislation would “simply require health care practitioners to provide complete
information to women who receive a prenatal diagnosis for Down syndrome so that they are
better informed with regard to the positive outcomes of giving birth to a” child with this
condition).
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found it necessary to pass such legislation can be read as an indictment
of the current state of prenatal genetic counseling.  Moreover, the ideo-
logical diversity of the states passing such laws, coupled with the bi-
partisan support they have received, indicates that underinformed termi-
nations for fetal anomaly are a significant concern whether one is pro-
choice or pro-life.
Though it is still too early to determine if state legislation in this
area will achieve its overall objectives, even assuming perfect implemen-
tation, there remain a number of concerns.  First and foremost, there are
still 39 states—covering roughly 75% of the population130—with no pro-
information legislation to supplement the underfunded and ineffective
PPDCAA.  Women in these states must therefore rely on individual re-
search and whatever information their health care providers deem appro-
priate in determining whether to proceed with their pregnancies.  Second,
six of the eleven states that have passed pro-information legislation ad-
dress it exclusively to Down syndrome and are silent with respect to
other prenatally and postnatally diagnosed conditions (recall that a sev-
enth, Kentucky, addresses just Down syndrome and spina bifida).  This
means that in these states there is no legislative mandate to provide im-
proved information for other fetal abnormalities such as cystic fibrosis,
sickle-cell anemia, neural tube defects, or syndromes such as Edwards,
Patau, Angelman, or Beckwith-Wiedemann—the diagnosis of any one of
which forces a pregnant woman to grapple with emotional, ethical, and
psychological concerns similar to learning her fetus has Down syndrome.
Finally, given the overall objective of delivering much-needed informa-
tion to women deciding how to address a fetal abnormality, it is troubling
that some states make the provision of the information discretionary
rather than mandatory.131
In sum, despite the headway made by these eleven states, there re-
main significant gaps in existing pro-information legislation at the state
level, and we are only beginning to scratch the surface of delivering this
crucial information nationwide.  While it should be taken as a positive
first step that states are increasingly sensitive to these concerns, the
130 See 2014 Population Estimates, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1,
2010 to July 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2014_PEPANNRES&src=pt (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) (showing that the aggregate population of the eleven states having passed pro-informa-
tion is just over 80 million, and the population of the United States as a whole is near 309
million).
131 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-1502(c)(1) (2014) (“On receipt of a
positive test result . . . a health care facility of health care provider may provide to the expec-
tant parent . . . written information provided or made available by . . . this section.”) (emphasis
added); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01(B) (2008) (requiring that medical information be dis-
tributed upon discovering a prenatally diagnosed condition but leaving the provision of infor-
mation regarding education and support programs).
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pressing need for more effective and further reaching pro-information
legislation will become readily apparent in the near future, when prenatal
genetic analysis becomes normalized and the concomitant number of de-
tected fetal abnormalities begins to skyrocket.  The following Part de-
scribes two key factors contributing to the emergent growth in prenatal
genetic analysis and discusses the corresponding increase in the need for
improved dissemination of information relating to fetal abnormalities.
IV. THE EMERGENT GROWTH IN PRENATAL GENETIC ANALYSIS
Though many pregnant women opt out of prenatal genetic screening
and less than 2% nationwide undergo prenatal testing,132 current rates of
genetic analysis will rise sharply in future years due to the combination
of two recent developments.  First is the passage and ongoing implemen-
tation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).133
Among its numerous mandates, the ACA enlarges the number of moder-
ate-income women who are eligible for Medicaid—a federal/state medi-
cal insurance program that in the majority of states provides free or low-
cost prenatal genetic screening and testing.134  The ACA also requires
that that all health insurance plans, public or private, provide certain es-
sential benefits, and includes maternity and newborn care—which may
include prenatal genetic screening and testing—among them.  Lastly, the
ACA makes mandatory coverage of certain preventive care for women,
which will include prenatal genetic screening and testing in many states.
The second recent development is the evolving manner in which
pregnant women can learn of prenatal genetic abnormalities.  Whereas
currently the prevailing forms of genetic testing—CVS and amni-
ocentesis—are invasive, painful, and potentially fatal to the fetus, cut-
ting-edge methods of Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD) have
emerged in recent years and are quickly being adopted in clinical set-
tings.  These methods will soon allow women to screen, and perhaps test,
for a host of fetal genetic abnormalities with unprecedented accuracy by
providing a small sample of maternal blood in the early stages of preg-
nancy, without any potential of harming the fetus.  As NIPD becomes a
normalized component of prenatal care in the coming years, more wo-
men will learn of fetal abnormalities early in their pregnancies, thereby
growing the population of expectant mothers in need of improved coun-
132 Greely, supra note 18, at 289. R
133 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2012).
134 USHA RANJI ET AL., STATE MEDICAID COVERAGE OF PERINATAL SERVICES: SUMMARY
OF STATE SURVEY FINDINGS 3 (2009), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/8014.pdf (finding that “36 states and DC cover genetic screening services, 40 states
and DC cover chorionic villus sampling (CVS) and 42 and DC cover amniocentesis”).
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seling and better information.  The following sections provide a brief
overview of these recent developments and their implications.
A. The Affordable Care Act
1. Medicaid Expansion
The Affordable Care Act drastically increases the number of Ameri-
cans who are eligible for Medicaid.135  Among those newly covered
under the Medicaid expansion and other provisions of the ACA will be
approximately thirteen million women of childbearing age.136  These
new enrollees will in large measure have free or low-cost access to pre-
natal genetic screening, testing, or both.  A recent Kaiser Family Founda-
tion study found that Medicaid programs in 36 States and the District of
Columbia cover genetic screening, 40 States and the District cover
chorionic villus sampling (CVS), and 42 states and the District cover
amniocentesis.137  The expansion of the pool of women with free or
heavily subsidized access to genetic screening and testing will result in
an inevitable rise in the number of those taking advantage of these diag-
nostic tools, and a concomitant increase in the number of prenatal genetic
abnormalities that are identified.
2. Defining “Essential Health Benefits”
Perhaps more important than the expansion of Medicaid is the
ACA’s delineation of the “essential health benefits” all health insurance
plans must provide with limited cost-sharing (such as co-pays, co-insur-
ance, and deductibles).138  Among the ten essential health benefits
(EHBs) is “Maternity and newborn care.”139  Though the ACA does not
explicitly reference prenatal genetic screening or testing as an essential
health benefit, the regulations for defining EHBs permit individual states
135 THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER
11 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334-05.pdf (“The
ACA expands Medicaid by establishing a new Medicaid eligibility group for adults under age
65 with income at or below 138% [of the federal poverty level].  These adults make up about
half the uninsured.  Accounting for enrollment among adults who gain Medicaid eligibility due
to the expansion, as well as increases in participation among children and adults eligible for
Medicaid prior to the ACA, Medicaid enrollment is expected to increase by 21.3 million by
2022.”).
136 Rebouche´ & Rothenberg, supra note 32, at 994. R
137 RANJI ET AL., supra note 134, at 14.  In addition, one study found that Medicaid in 24 R
states covers prenatal genetic counseling. See COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN,
INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 61 (2011)
[hereinafter CLOSING THE GAPS], http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13181.
138 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012).
139 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(D) (2012).
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to determine their scale and scope,140 through the selection of currently-
existing benchmark insurance plans.141
All state benchmark plans currently provide “prenatal and postnatal
care” as an EHB.142  And though the inclusion of genetic screening, test-
ing, or both in this category is unclear with respect to many states, the
benchmark plans of California143 and Hawaii144 specifically include
these diagnostic tools.  Other states having benchmark plans that are si-
lent in this regard require that insurers cover prenatal genetic screening
and testing by statute.145  Though it remains to be seen how many state
benchmark plans will ultimately define covered “prenatal and postnatal
care” to include prenatal genetic screening, testing, or both,146 there can
be no doubt that there will be an overall increase in covered prenatal care
under the Affordable Care Act.147  It follows that the number of non-
140 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2013); see also Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States
Tailor Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A1.
141 45 C.F.R. § 156.100(a) (2013).  The default for those states that do not select bench-
mark plans is the “the largest plan by enrollment in the largest product by enrollment in the
State’s small group market.”  45 C.F.R. § 156.100(c) (2013).
142 See Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans, CTRS. FOR
MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/ehb.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
143 CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., CALIFORNIA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN
7–8, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/Updated-California-
Benchmark-Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
144 CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., HAWAII EHB BENCHMARK PLAN 6, 9,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/Updated-Hawaii-Bench-
mark-Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
145 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.344 (West 2013) (“[E]very group health
care services contract entered into or renewed that covers hospital, medical, or surgical ex-
penses on a group basis, and which provides benefits for pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions to enrollees of such groups, shall offer benefits for prenatal diagnosis of
congenital disorders of the fetus by means of screening and diagnostic procedures during preg-
nancy to such enrollees when those services are determined to be medically necessary . . . .”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23-6.1 (LexisNexis 2013) (“A blanket or group health policy, health
care plan or certificate of health insurance that is delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in
the state shall provide coverage for an alpha-fetoprotein IV screening test for pregnant women,
generally between sixteen and twenty weeks of pregnancy, to screen for certain genetic abnor-
malities in the fetus.”); see also Rebouche´ & Rothenberg, supra note 32, at 997 (inferring that R
Alabama, Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin cover prenatal genetic testing
and screening because they mandate that insurers cover all “medically necessary” prenatal
care).
146 There also remains the legislative option noted above. See supra note 145 and accom- R
panying text.
147 See, e.g., Adam Sonfield & Harold A. Pollack, The Affordable Care Act and Repro-
ductive Health: Potential Gains and Serious Challenges, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 373,
374 (2013) (“The [ACA] has the potential to have a positive impact on reproductive health in
at least three ways: (1) increasing the number of women and men with insurance coverage; (2)
increasing the value of insurance coverage for addressing reproductive health; and (3) improv-
ing access to reproductive health services and information more generally.”); Rebekah E. Gee
& Sara Rosenbaum, The Affordable Care Act: An Overview for Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 120 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1263, 1265 (2012) (“The Act’s emphasis on enhanced
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Medicaid insureds who have low-cost access to such care will undoubt-
edly increase, further expanding the number of prenatal genetic
diagnoses.
3. Preventive Care Mandate
Finally, access to prenatal genetic screening and testing could also
be reasonably construed as a matter of right under the ACA’s preventive
care mandate. Pursuant to the Act, all insurers must provide minimum
coverage without cost sharing (co-pays, co-insurance, and deductibles)
for certain preventive services.148  Included within this minimum cover-
age is, with respect to women, “such preventive care and screen-
ings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration [HRSA].”149  The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations accompanying
this statutory provision further specify the coverage insurers must pro-
vide free of charge.150  They require that all plans cover “evidence-in-
formed preventive care and screenings” for women, again as determined
by “guidelines supported by the [HRSA],”151 a division of DHHS.
In crafting the relevant guidelines, DHHS commissioned a study
from the Institute of Medicine (IOM), a third-party organization.  The
IOM submitted its recommendations in a report titled Clinical Preventive
Services for Women: Closing the Gaps.152  Most relevant among the
many conclusions found in its 236-page report, the IOM recommended
“at least one well-woman preventive care visit annually for adult women
to obtain the recommended preventive services, including preconception
and prenatal care.”153  It further recommended that covered prenatal vis-
its be required to incorporate a number of “tests and procedures,” includ-
ing “screening for . . . genetic or developmental conditions.”154  Though
primary care can be expected to result in important opportunities for broader access to obstetri-
cians and gynecologists.  As a result, the Act may create an unprecedented demand for care.
Insurance expansions mean that millions of American women now will be able to establish a
regular source of primary and preventive care.”); ALISON CUELLAR ET AL., OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND WOMEN 2 (2012) (“Eliminating such barriers as copayments, co-
insurance, and deductibles will increase access to services that improve the health of women
and their children.”).
148 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).
149 Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
150 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2013).
151 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (“With respect to women . . . evidence-informed
preventive care and screenings provided for in binding comprehensive health plan coverage
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.”).
152 CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 137. R
153 Id. at 12.
154 Id. at 133; see also id. at 56–57 (endorsing the National Business Group on Health’s
list of 46 recommended benefits directly relevant to women that should be included in all
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not endorsing prenatal genetic testing or screening directly, the HRSA
has indicated that its interpretation of the preventive care mandate with
respect to women is in lock-step with the IOM report.155
In short, both the IOM and HRSA, the agency authorized to issue
guidelines under the ACA, consider prenatal genetic analysis of some
form to fall under the Affordable Care Act’s “preventive care and screen-
ing” mandate.  Because the ACA relies on these two agencies (either
directly or indirectly) to interpret its language, it is reasonable to infer
that the Act mandates that many, if not all, insured expectant women
have access to prenatal testing, screening, or both.  Acknowledging that
Courts will vary in resolving this question going forward, it is safe to
assume that in at least some jurisdictions, prenatal genetic screening,
testing, or both will become the right of any insured pregnant women,
rather than the privilege of those with superior insurance or the means to
pay for it.
* * *
The combination of the Affordable Care Act’s expanding Medicaid
coverage, defining maternity and newborn care as an essential health
benefit, and mandating that certain preventive care be covered by all in-
surers will result in an unprecedented increase in the number of women
who have access to free or low-cost prenatal genetic screening, testing,
or both.  Though it is unclear how each of these measures will ultimately
play out, there can be no doubt that there will be a significant increase in
access to prenatal genetic analysis in many jurisdictions, which will act
to exacerbate the need for improved support in navigating the ethical
challenges inherent in the discovery of a prenatal genetic abnormality
and the subsequent decision whether to terminate.
B. The Emergence of NIPD
Separate and apart from the increased need for genetic counseling
and improved information regarding fetal abnormalities resulting from
Affordable Care Act’s expansion of coverage is the impact that emerging
methods of Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD) will have on preg-
nant women.  The varying methods of NIPD are all built upon the 1997
discovery that fetal cell-free DNA (cfDNA) circulates in, and can be ex-
health plans, among them: “Pregnant women should receive . . . prenatal screening and testing
for neural tube defects (for all women at elevated risk) and chromosomal abnormalities (for all
women age 35 years and older), including, but not limited to amniocentesis, chorionic villus
sampling, and ultrasound.”).
155 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., www.hrsa
.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (“HRSA is supporting the IOM’s recom-
mendations on preventive services that address health needs specific to women and fill gaps in
existing guidelines.”).
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tracted from, maternal plasma.156  Technicians can thus obtain and ana-
lyze fetal genetic material from a maternal blood sample,157 as early as
the tenth week of gestation.158  Once separated from the plasma and iso-
lated, cfDNA can be sequenced and assessed for risk through use of an
algorithm.
The accuracy of NIPD is extraordinary. In a recent study of 15,841
women at 35 international centers, cfDNA analysis detected 100% of
fetuses having Trisomy 21, or Down syndrome, while standard screening
(which included serum screening and testing for nuchal translucency) de-
tected only 78.9%.159  Perhaps more important, cfDNA analysis pro-
duced just 9 false positives for Trisomy 21 (.06%), as opposed to 854
false positive results (5.4%) on standard screening.160  In the same study,
cfDNA also outpaced standard screening in identifying Trisomy 18, or
Edwards syndrome.  Of the 10 cases in the study, cfDNA identified 9,
with one false positive, while standard screening identified 8, with 49
false positive results.161  And for Trisomy 13, Patau syndrome, cfDNA
identified both cases (with one false positive), while standard screening
identified one (with 28 false positives).162
The accuracy of cfDNA analysis in this study is not anomalous163—
cfDNA is clearly superior to standard screening in relation to certain
fetal abnormalities, particularly in terms of false positives.164  The cur-
rent question, given cfDNA’s high rate of accuracy, is to what extent it
may or should be relied upon in diagnosing fetal abnormalities.  In other
words, where does cfDNA fit within the current menu of fetal genetic
156 See Anita de Jong et al., Non-invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues Explored, 18
EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 272, 272 (2010).
157 Devers et al., supra note 5, at 292. R
158 See, e.g., Mary E. Norton et al., Non-Invasive Chromosomal Evaluation (NICE) Study:
Results of a Multicenter Prospective Study for Detection of Fetal Trisomy 21 and Trisomy 18,
207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 137.e1, 131.e2 (2012) (requiring that study partici-
pants be at a gestational age greater than or equal to ten weeks); Andrew B. Sparks et al.,
Noninvasive Prenatal Detection and Selective Analysis of Cell-Free DNA Obtained from Ma-
ternal Blood: Evaluation for Trisomy 21 and Trisomy 18, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
OGY 319.e1, 319.e2 (2012) (describing a study requiring that participants be at a gestational
age greater than or equal to ten weeks).
159 Mary E. Norton et al., Cell-free DNA Analysis for Noninvasive Examination of Tri-
somy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1589, 1593 (2015).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1594.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Norton et al., supra note 158, at 137.e4–e5 (identifying 100% of Trisomy 21 R
cases with a false positive rate of .01% and 97.4% of Trisomy 18 cases with a false positive
rate of .07%); Sparks et al., supra note 158, at 319.e4 (detecting 100% of Trisomy 21 and R
Trisomy 18).
164 See Norton et al., supra note 159, at 1595 (“The false positive rate of cfDNA testing R
was nearly 100 times lower than that of standard screening” for Trisomy 21).
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analysis tools available to pregnant women?165  One study hypothesized
five possibilities: 1) “as an additional test to improve overall risk assess-
ment,” 2) “as an intermediate test between risk assessment and invasive
diagnostic testing for high-risk pregnancies,” 3) “as a replacement for
current risk-assessment tests,” 4) “as a replacement for current invasive
diagnostic tests,” or 5) “as a replacement for both risk-assessment and
diagnostic tests.”166
NIPD has already served functions one through three, acting as a
screening mechanism deployed with or in lieu of traditional risk-assess-
ment in advance of diagnostic genetic testing (usually by way of CVS or
amniocentesis).  It now appears that we are edging ever closer to the day
when cfDNA will serve the fourth and fifth functions, replacing invasive
diagnostic testing and, perhaps, becoming the standard method of risk
assessment.167  Should cfDNA analysis of a small sample of maternal
blood emerge as a standard of prenatal care and its results understood as
diagnostic, it would mark a radical shift.
California, which has a statewide prenatal genetic screening and
testing program covering blood tests, amniocentesis, chorionic villus
sampling, and diagnostic ultrasound,168 provides a useful basis for extra-
polating the potential impact of normalizing diagnostic cfDNA analysis.
There, roughly 2/3 of pregnant women undergo noninvasive prenatal ge-
netic screening.169  As Stanford Law School professor Henry Greely cal-
culated in Nature, if the same proportion of women were to opt for
noninvasive prenatal genetic testing nationwide, the number of fetuses
tested annually would jump from fewer than 100,000 to roughly 3 mil-
lion.170  This thirty-fold increase would produce a heretofore unimagin-
165 See Norton et al., supra note 158, at 137.e7 (noting that “the place of this technology R
remains uncertain” and discussing the potential use of cfDNA analysis as “an intermediate
screening tool” or “an alternative to invasive diagnostic testing”).
166 De Jong et al., supra note 156, at 273 (citing CAROLINE WRIGHT, CELL-FREE FETAL R
NUCLEIC ACIDS FOR NON-INVASIVE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS (2009), http://www.phgfoundation
.org/download/ffdna/ffDNA_report.pdf).
167 See, e.g., Sparks et al., supra note 158, at 319.e8–e9 (observing that should cfDNA R
analysis become cheaper and more accessible, it may replace the “myriad screening and testing
options today,” save ultrasound); Elisavet A. Papageorgiou et al., Fetal-specific DNA Methyl-
ation Ratio Permits Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis of Trisomy 21, 17 NAT. MED. 510, 513
(2011) (observing that, given recent advances in cfDNA analysis, NIPD may be “employed in
the routine practice of all diagnostic laboratories and be applicable to all pregnancies” in diag-
nosing Trisomy 21, thereby avoiding the “risk of miscarriages of normal pregnancies caused
by current, more invasive procedures” and speculating that it can potentially be employed to
detect anomalies in chromosomes 13, 18, X, and Y).
168 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 125050 (2015).
169 Greely, supra note 18, at 290. R
170 Id.
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able wave of women struggling to understand their tests, the implications
of a positive result, and how to proceed.171
C. Implications on the Future of Prenatal Diagnosis
Taken together, the expanded coverage of prenatal genetic screen-
ing and testing under the ACA and the emergence of NIPD as a poten-
tially normalized diagnostic component of prenatal care will increase the
population of women who undergo prenatal genetic analysis and intro-
duce a new population to the vexing ethical dilemma of whether to termi-
nate a genetically anomalous fetus.  As shown above, genetic
terminations have far-reaching psychological consequences for the
mother, her partner, and living children, and while federal and state legis-
lative efforts to provide women with adequate information and access to
support during the decisionmaking process are notable in their existence,
they do not go nearly far enough in scale or in scope.  Given the short-
comings of prenatal genetic counseling in its current form, one can only
imagine how ineffective it will become under the increased number of
pregnant women in need of its services pursuant to the ACA and the
emergence of NIPD.  The following Part offers suggestions for how bet-
ter to support and deliver information to the growing population of wo-
men requiring prenatal genetic counseling, with an emphasis on
alleviating the psychological impacts of underinformed genetic
terminations.
V. A NEW LEGISLATIVE AND COUNSELING FRAMEWORK
The proposals set forth in this Part are built upon the following
points that have been established above.  Whether their main point of
contact is a genetic counselor or other heath care professional, women
learning of a genetic fetal abnormality are presented with selective, inad-
equate information that they often do not understand.  This presentation
of information, combined with genetic counseling that is often directive
in practice, leads to underinformed terminations for fetal abnormalities.
The resultant genetic terminations are traumatic major life events that
produce high rates of grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress, some-
times for years.  And due to recent legislative and technological develop-
ments likely to normalize prenatal genetic analysis, there will be an
171 That women undergoing diagnostic NIPD would on average learn of their fetal anom-
aly earlier in pregnancy than under the currently prevailing methods of genetic testing is im-
material insofar as they will still have to grapple with the dilemma of whether to terminate a
wanted pregnancy and deal with the adverse consequences should they choose to do so. See
RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 161 (noting that termination due to a fetal abnor- R
mality is “often a shattering experience” in “both ‘early’ as well as ‘late’ genetic abortions”)
(citations omitted).  The authors add, “there may be instances in which an early abortion may
present more difficulties than a later abortion.” Id.
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exacerbation of each of these problems in the coming years.  Lastly,
though Congress and state legislatures have attempted to provide women
with improved medical and support information so as to help them make
better-informed choices, existing federal and state legislation is inade-
quate due to the combination of limited funding, drafting oversights, and
limitations in scale and scope.
A. Conceptualizing Model Legislation
Addressing these problems requires both legislation that will pro-
mote the dissemination of adequate information to expecting parents and
the establishment of best practices for healthcare professionals delivering
the message.  Though the federal PPDCAA has been ineffective due to
underfunding, it contains key elements of a model pro-information legis-
lation.172  Addressed to all prenatally and postnatally diagnosed condi-
tions rather than just Down syndrome, the PPDCAA calls for the
provision of “[u]p to date, evidence-based, written information concern-
ing the range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed con-
dition, including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial
outcomes.”173  Requiring that the “range of outcomes” be presented is
most important, as women undergoing prenatal genetic counseling cur-
rently receive selective information about fetal anomalies and their possi-
ble outcomes, which is informed by both the nature of the anomaly and
various cultural, educational, and socioeconomic factors.174
The PPDCAA also mandates the provision of “[c]ontact information
regarding support services,” including information hotlines, “resource
centers or clearinghouses, national and local peer support groups, and
other education and support programs . . . .”175  Most important here are
the support services.  As will be discussed below, one of the most consis-
tent findings in studies of women who have terminated due to a fetal
abnormality is that they often lack adequate support, and lack of support
during both the decision-making process and after termination is a signif-
icant risk factor for grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress.
By addressing an array of conditions, providing information about
the range of outcomes for prenatal genetic diagnoses, and endeavoring to
connect women with much-needed support services, the PPDCAA
172 Indeed, the National Down Syndrome Society’s model prenatal testing legislation, part
of its “Pro-Information State Law Toolkit,” tracks the PPDCAA closely. Compare Prenatally
and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051
(2008), with Sample Prenatal Testing Information Model Legislation, NAT’L DOWN SYN-
DROME SOC’Y, http://www.ndss.org/PageFiles/5025/Bill%20H03825.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Model Legislation].
173 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(c)(1)(A) (2012).
174 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. R
175 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(c)(1)(B).
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touches on the main concerns that are key in creating model legislation.
But the legislation is not without its faults. Its main problem (other than
underfunding) is that it requires that this information be provided “to
health care providers of parents who receive a prenatal or postnatal diag-
nosis,”176 rather than the parents themselves.  It is likely that many prov-
iders already have access to much of this information; the problem is that
parents are not receiving it, and the PPDCAA does nothing in this regard.
The National Down Syndrome Society’s model legislation,177 as well as
the legislation that has been enacted in several states,178 corrects this
shortcoming by requiring that parents be provided with relevant medical
and contact information.  Future legislation should follow these states by
ensuring that parents, and not just their caregivers, receive this
information.
Borrowing from Kansas’s Prenatal and Postnatal Diagnosed Condi-
tions Awareness program could also help the PPDCAA serve as a better
model.  Kansas’s statute grants the Secretary of the Department of Health
authority to grant and oversee certain programs relating to fetal abnor-
malities.  Though most are familiar, one stands out: “the establishment of
a network of local registries of families willing to adopt newborns with
Down syndrome or other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions
and links to adoption agencies willing to place babies with [these] condi-
tions with families willing to adopt.”179  This provision, unique to Kan-
sas, can serve an important function for women who believe they are
unprepared to raise a child with a fetal abnormality, but at the same time
do not believe termination is the right choice for them.
Be it state or federal, effective legislation must incorporate each of
these elements, and the medical, range of outcomes, and support (includ-
ing peer support and adoption options) information gathered about each
prenatally or postnatally diagnosed condition must be provided to wo-
men rather than just their providers.  That said, the efficacy of even the
finest pro-information legislation will ultimately turn on its ground-level
implementation.  The following section offers suggestions for how to
translate broad legislative mandates regarding prenatal and postnatal di-
agnoses into effective treatment, from when women first learn of the
possibility of a fetal abnormality through after termination or delivery.
176 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(c)(1).
177 Model Legislation, supra note 172, § 1(a) (requiring that facilities, physicians, health R
care, providers, nurse midwives, or genetic counselors “provide the expectant or new parent”
with medical and support information).
178 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.69(B) (2014) (requiring that health care pro-
fessionals and facilities provide patients with medical and support information); 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6243(a) (2014) (same); FLA. STAT. § 383.141(2) (2012) (same).
179 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,259(a)(2)(D) (2013).
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B. Keys to Effective Implementation
Best practices for treating women carrying genetically anomalous
fetuses do not require legislation.  Indeed, facilities such as the Special
Delivery Unit at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, which deals exclu-
sively with fetuses having prenatally diagnosed conditions, already
devote a great deal of attention to providing adequate support.  Nonethe-
less, legislation requiring that women be provided access to educational
and support services will require radical changes for most hospitals, and
those seeking to abide by such legislation will be left wondering how
best to educate and support women so as to mitigate negative psycholog-
ical outcomes.
1. Support During Decision-making
Though there is little evidence regarding the efficacy of interven-
tions on patterns of grieving,180 as a point of departure health care pro-
fessionals should recognize that termination due to a fetal anomaly,
unlike other abortions, is a major life event for nearly all women181 and
experienced by both men and women as a trauma rather than a loss.182
Conceptualizing a genetic termination as a unique trauma informs how
women who learn of a fetal abnormality should be treated from the out-
set.  Caregivers should be frank in discussing potential outcomes with
their patients, offering guidance and psychological support during the
decision-making process so as “to avoid impulsive and not fully internal-
ized decisions.”183  In addition to describing the challenges of raising a
child born with a potential disability, caregivers should also explain that
grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress are distinct possibilities
should they choose to terminate.  Though such information might strike
some as coercive, it is essential to providing the mother with the ability
to make an informed choice.184  Indeed, painting a more complete picture
of potential outcomes of both termination and delivery would constitute a
meaningful step in moving prenatal genetic counseling closer to the elu-
sive goal of nondirectiveness.185
180 Kersting & Wagner, supra note 69, at 191. R
181 See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. R
182 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. R
183 Korenromp et al., supra note 68, at 259. R
184 RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 167 (“For an informed choice to be truly R
available pregnant women and their partners need to be told about the possible impact of
abortion on them and their other children, and they also need to have information about the
care of children with special needs.”); see also McCoyd, supra note 71, at 45 (noting with R
respect to genetically anomalous fetuses that “[p]ain would exist whether [parents] terminate
or whether they had a baby who then had to cope with medical and social challenges”).
185 See supra notes 41–55, 61 and accompanying text. R
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The exchange of information should be a two-way street; the ulti-
mate objective between woman and caregiver should be to achieve “mu-
tual satisfaction with the information provided.”186  Expecting mothers
should thus have access to frequent consultation—be it with a gynecolo-
gist, geneticist, genetic counselor, social worker, or psychiatrist—not
only after terminating (as will be discussed below), but when considering
termination as well.187  Given that lack of information ex ante is a persis-
tent concern in relation to genetic terminations,188 an open, iterative dia-
logue focused on providing the mother with information and reassurance
would go a long way toward fostering informed choices and better psy-
chological outcomes.189
2. Support After Termination
Even with a better understanding of potential outcomes and in-
creased access to supportive health care providers, many women will still
choose to terminate their genetically anomalous fetuses.  It is these wo-
men who stand to benefit most from a more particularized understanding
of genetic terminations that acknowledges the significant risk of psycho-
logical outcomes they entail.  Current standards of care—pursuant to
which there are frequently few formal post-termination supports availa-
ble other than a post-delivery or post-surgical exam190—are insuffi-
cient.191  What is needed is a well-organized192 and multidisciplinary193
plan of action focusing on the care, support, and understanding that wo-
men terminating for a fetal abnormality have identified as being most
important to them.194
Because routinely given preventative interventions addressing be-
reavement or traumatic events have not proved effective,195 the contours
of the support each woman receives should vary based on her circum-
stances.  In all cases, however, subsequent supportive interventions—be
186 See Nina Asplin et al., Pregnancy Termination due to Fetal Abnormality: Women’s
Reactions, Satisfaction and Experiences of Care, 30 MIDWIFERY 620, 625 (2014).
187 Korenromp et al., supra note 86, at 160.e6. R
188 See supra Part I.B; see also RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 70, at 167 R
(“Couples are not prepared for the depression and guilt that frequently ensue.  Nor are they
usually informed about the help that is available for raising children with special needs.”).
189 Korenromp et al., supra note 86, at 160.e6. R
190 McCoyd, supra note 71, at 45. R
191 Asplin et al., supra note 186, at 625.
192 Id. at 625 (“Well-organised follow-up care is essential after termination due to a fetal
malformation.”).
193 Korenromp et al., supra note 86, at 160.e6. R
194 Asplin et al., supra note 186, at 625; see also McCoyd, supra note 71, at 46 (noting R
that women “benefit from health care providers who assure adequate formal and informal
support resources and who allow them to process their feelings, expectations and dilemmas
with an empathetic manner”).
195 Korenromp et al., supra note 86, at 160.e6. R
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they by a gynecologist, geneticist, genetic counselor, social worker, or
psychiatrist—should reassure patients that any feelings of grief, depres-
sion, and trauma they are experiencing are in no way unusual.196  Access
to support groups, as referenced in the above discussion of model legisla-
tion,197 should also be made generally available, provided that, where
possible, they be comprised of individuals who have also decided to un-
dergo a genetic termination, rather than those who have experienced
other traumatic events.198
Beyond some form of empathetic and reassuring follow-up care and
access to support groups, women suffering from severe symptoms such
as post-traumatic stress should have access to ongoing psychotherapeutic
monitoring.199  This intervention is beneficial not only to the mother who
has terminated, but also to any living children, whose development can
be negatively impacted by maternal post-traumatic stress.200  Formalized
post-termination support can also benefit male partners, who may lack
informal peer support due to both prevailing gender norms and the right-
ful emphasis placed on their partner’s experience.201
Promoting the mental well-being of male partners can benefit wo-
men as well due to the “mutual influence between the partners in the
process of grieving.”202  Lack of partner support is a frequently identified
risk factor for significant post-termination psychological outcomes.203
The obvious corollary is that good adjustment to a genetic termination
“is dependent on the level of support [women] perceive from their part-
ners.”204  Accordingly, in its ideal form, whatever counseling is indicated
196 Id.
197 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. R
198 McCoyd, supra note 71, at 45 (“Women benefit from support where the whole story R
can be told, particularly in support groups designed for couples who have this experience.”);
Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Maternal Decision to Terminate Pregnancy After a Diagnosis of
Down Syndrome, 196 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 149, 150 (2007) (“Counseling
should include the presentation of information about professionally run support groups or self
help groups with other parents in similar situations.”).
199 Kersting et al., supra note 68, at 200; see also Asplin et al., supra note 186, at 625 R
(“Some patients can also benefit from being referred to a psychologist for evaluation/
treatment.”).
200 Kersting et al., supra note 68, at 200. R
201 France et al., supra note 75, at 31; see also supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text R
(noting that men experience grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress, but often have trouble
accessing emotional support and tend to suppress their emotions).
202 Korenromp et al., supra note 85, at 1232. R
203 See Korenromp et al., supra note 68, at 255 (“[W]omen who reported that they had R
experienced little support from their partners had the most unfavourable scores on the psycho-
logical inventories.”); Korenromp et al., supra note 85, at 1232 (noting in a study of 151 R
couples that “women in particular showed lower levels of grief and depression when they had
perceived good support of their partner”).
204 Korenromp et al., supra note 85, at 1232. R
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should involve both partners as much as possible.205  As one study sum-
marized, “Both partners have to be equally involved in the counseling.
Both are parents of the child . . . the choice not to continue the pregnancy
is their joint decision, and both suffer psychological distress.”206  Though
currently uncommon and not without its challenges,207 widespread inclu-
sion of male partners in post-termination counseling would be an impor-
tant step in alleviating psychological outcomes for father and mother
alike.
In sum, counseling during the decisionmaking process should can-
didly acknowledge the potential psychological downsides of terminating
on genetic grounds.  There should also be open channels of communica-
tion during this period in order to ensure mutually satisfactory sharing of
information.  All women who terminate their pregnancies should receive
some form of counseling (rather than just medical follow up) informed
by reassurance, empathy, care, support, and understanding, and should
also have access to group therapy with others who have terminated on
genetic grounds.  Those requiring it, male and female alike, should have
access to subsequent psychological treatment.  And male partners should
generally be included in all forms of post-termination support.
Notwithstanding that there could be other possible interventions—
such as a special emphasis on other risk factors like low levels of educa-
tion208 or support catering to children—embracing this approach to ap-
plying pro-information legislation relating to prenatally and postnatally
diagnosed conditions will address a large majority of the concerns relat-
ing to genetic terminations raised in this Article.  Though ideal legisla-
tion with perfect, individualized implementation is a far-fetched
aspiration, widespread clinical application of any of these suggestions
has the potential to alleviate the severe psychological impacts of genetic
terminations for many women.  Ultimately, what is most important is
that policymakers better understand the unique nature of this problem
and take steps to address it more effectively as it grows in scale and
scope in the upcoming years.
205 Kersting & Wagner, supra note 69, at 191 (recommending that intervention ap- R
proaches “should involve male partners, including them in psychotherapy and ensuring an
ongoing dialogue between the grieving parents”); Korenromp et al., supra note 85, at 1232 R
(emphasizing the “importance of involving both parents in the counselling”); Korenromp et al.,
supra note 198, at 150 (noting that it is “essential to involve always both partners in the R
counseling” after a Down syndrome diagnosis).
206 Korenromp et al., supra note 92, at 714. R
207 Robson, supra note 96, at 191 (noting the need “to include the male as an equal R
partner, but at the same time understand the male’s need to protect his identity as supporter”).
208 See Korenromp et al., supra note 68, at 259 (“Low-educated patients are more vulner- R
able and consequently need more support”); see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying R
text.
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CONCLUSION
Pregnancy termination due to a fetal abnormality is a unique cate-
gory of abortion resulting in a significant risk of grief, depression, and
post-traumatic stress for women and their partners, as well as potential
harm to living children.  Women who learn of a fetal abnormality are
forced to reconsider having an abortion after already having declined to
terminate.  The information they receive as they decide whether to bring
a genetically anomalous fetus to term is incomplete, informed by their
perceived status and ability to care for a child having a potential disabil-
ity, and at times directive in encouraging termination.  Eleven states and
Congress have attempted to address this information deficit legislatively,
but these efforts suffer from drafting oversights and limitations in scale
and scope that render them largely ineffective.  Due to the recent expan-
sion of insurance coverage for prenatal genetic analysis under the Af-
fordable Care Act and the arrival of noninvasive methods of prenatal
genetic testing, the number of women who learn of fetal abnormalities
during pregnancy will rise sharply in coming years.  This will broaden
the pool of women and their families forced to grapple with the ethical
challenges of considering a genetic termination and will expose a far
larger population to potentially life-altering psychological consequences.
The proposals set forth in this Article aim to provide those facing this
challenge with adequate information about the range of pregnancy out-
comes and access to the support services available to them whether or
not they choose to terminate.  In this regard it is but a modest proposal,
though addressed to a crucial and growing need.
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